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1. Introduction 
Cross-country heterogeneity represents one of the most important is-
sues that are currently under investigation in the field of growth theo-
ry. Since countries in the world economy are characterized by differ-
ent initial conditions, structural characteristics and growth trajectories, 
growth scholars have in the last couple of decades shown an increas-
ing dissatisfaction with the standard convergence regression approach, 
and experienced with a number of different methods and approaches 
in the attempt to provide a better treatment of the cross-country heter-
ogeneity issue (Temple, 1999; Durlauf et al., 2005).  
 
One of these approaches is provided by the convergence clubs litera-
ture. Durlauf and Johnson (1995) opened up this stream of research by 
showing the existence of different groups of countries with substan-
tially different initial conditions and growth behavior. Subsequent ap-
plied studies refined this approach and pointed out a number of factors 
that may determine the existence of multiple growth regimes, among 
which international trade, human capital and technological capabilities 
(Papageorgiou, 2002; Stokke, 2004; Castellacci and Archibugi, 2008; 
Castellacci, 2011; Filippetti and Peyrache, 2011). 
 
In parallel to these advances in the applied growth literature, a new 
class of theoretical models flourished in the attempt to explain these 
empirical facts on clustering, polarization and convergence clubs. 
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) presented a seminal multiple equilibria 
model in which threshold externalities in the accumulation of human 
capital explain non-linearities in the growth process and the existence 
of different convergence clubs. More recently, Schumpeterian multi-
ple equilibria models pointed out the important role of technological 
innovation and the imitation capabilities of nations, and showed that 
these explain the existence of three distinct groups of countries as well 
as the shift from a given development stage to a more advanced one 
(Galor, 2005; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). 
 
Despite the considerable progress of research in this field, there is one 
important fact that has not been adequately addressed yet: there exists 
a sharp contrast between empirical studies and theoretical models in 
this field. Multiple equilibria growth models have adopted a truly dy-
namic approach in the attempt to uncover the mechanisms that may 
explain why a given country may (or may not) shift from a given de-
velopment stage to a more advanced club. By contrast, applied works 
have largely focused on the cross-country dimension – pointing out 
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what are the critical factors of success for different groups of coun-
tries. This contrast between theoretical and empirical research repre-
sents an important gap in this literature. Empirical studies of conver-
gence clubs and multiple growth regimes should have a more explicit-
ly dynamic focus and adopt time series methods and approaches to a 
much larger extent than it has been the case so far. This is the route we 
take in this paper. 
 
The paper presents an empirical analysis of the time series properties 
of Schumpeterian multiple equilibria models. It considers a panel of 
116 countries over the period 1980-2008, and makes use of panel 
cointegration analysis and Granger causality tests to identify the set of 
dynamic relationships linking together innovation, absorptive capacity 
and economic growth in different country clubs. 
 
Our empirical analysis presents three main novel aspects: it addresses 
the dynamics, heterogeneity and multi-dimensionality of the growth 
process. Its main objective is to investigate dynamic (time series coin-
tegration) relationships among growth factors in a large panel of 
economies over the last three-decade period, in the attempt to close 
the gap between theoretical and applied models in this field. It ad-
dresses the heterogeneity issue by investigating how the model differs 
in distinct country groups (three major clubs, plus a few sub-groups 
within each country club). This is intended to shed new light on the 
factors that enable a country to shift from one development stage to a 
more advanced one, rather than simply comparing the characteristics 
of different country clubs in a static cross-sectional fashion. Finally, 
the model adopts a multi-dimensional approach by simultaneously 
considering several main drivers of economic growth at different de-
velopment stages rather than focusing on only one or few of them as 
typically done in the modelling literature. As such, our empirical 
model does not aim at testing a specific multiple equilibria growth 
model among those that have been presented in this field, but it rather 
provides a more general and flexible framework to investigate the em-
pirical validity of the Schumpeterian multiple growth regimes litera-
ture in a time-series perspective. 
 
The results provide general support for this class of models and show 
that absorptive capacity and innovation progressively become more 
important engines of growth as the development process unfolds over 
time. Relatedly, the complexity of the economic system – measured by 
the number of significant Granger causal relationships driving eco-
nomic growth – increases as we move from the less-developed, to the 
middle-income and then to the advanced country clubs. This finding 
of an increasing complexity along the stages of development is related 
to Hausman and Hidalgo’s (2011) recent model, according to which 
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the network structure of economic output becomes more complex over 
time as countries specialize in a more differentiated and more ad-
vanced set of products (see also Hidalgo and Hausman, 2009). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
convergence clubs and multiple equilibria models, section 3 presents 
the empirical model and hypotheses, section 4 describes the data and 
indicators, section 5 explains the empirical methods, section 6 pre-
sents the empirical results, and section 7 concludes by discussing the 
main contributions and limitations of the paper. 
   
 
2. Literature: convergence clubs and 
multiple equilibria models 
In the last two decades, applied growth theory has largely reconsid-
ered the convergence hypothesis and criticized its standard formula-
tion by focusing on the heterogeneity issue (see overviews in Temple, 
1999, and Durlauf et al., 2005). Countries differ greatly in terms of 
their growth performance as well as the underlying set of economic 
and institutional factors that may explain it. Inspired by the seminal 
study of Baumol (1986) that pointed out the existence of three distinct 
convergence clubs, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) opened up a new 
stream of applied growth literature studying the factors that may ex-
plain the emergence of different country groups, and how the growth 
performance of these differ over time.  
 
A few recent empirical studies have extended the convergence clubs 
literature and pointed to innovation and international technology dif-
fusion as the main factors that may explain the existence of multiple 
growth regimes. This new literature on technology clubs, rooted in the 
Schumpeterian growth tradition, investigates how the technology-
growth relationship differs across country groups, and what is the role 
of innovation and absorptive capacity for countries at different stages 
of technological development (Castellacci, 2008; Castellacci and 
Archibugi, 2008; Castellacci, 2011; Filippetti and Peyrache, 2011). 
 
These empirical findings on polarization and non-linearities in the 
growth process have inspired a class of theoretical models that seek to 
achieve a more thorough understanding of the mechanisms generating 
multiple growth regimes. These are the so-called multiple equilibria 
growth models, which are related to older development stages theo-
ries. Multiple equilibria models are threshold models that investigate 
the factors that explain why a country may (or may not) shift from a 
given development stage to a more advanced one, and whether the in-
teractions between different engines of growth may play a role to ex-
plain non-linearities in the growth process.  
 
A seminal model in the field is the one proposed by Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990). This model augments the neoclassical growth model 
with a new feature that produces multiple growth paths: threshold ex-
ternalities in the accumulation of human capital. The threshold proper-
ty and non-linearity of the model are explained by the mechanism 
through which individual agents accumulate human capital. Individual 
10  Fulvio Castellacci and Jose Miguel Natera 
investments in education are assumed to depend on two factors: the 
time invested in human capital formation by each individual, and the 
private yield on education. The latter factor, in turn, is assumed to be a 
positive function of the average (aggregate) level of human capital in 
the economy. This formalization generates threshold externalities be-
cause the private incentives to invest in education increase rapidly 
above a certain threshold level of aggregate human capital, whereas 
below this given threshold low private yields cause stagnant growth of 
aggregate human capital and, hence, economic growth. In this model, 
different initial conditions in terms of human capital levels may there-
fore explain long-run dynamics of national economies that cannot be 
defined by a single set of parameters. 
 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Verspagen’ s (1991) models introduced 
the important idea that threshold and non-linearities in the growth pro-
cess may be explained by the interaction between human capital and 
technological dynamics, i.e. they pointed out an exponential diffusion 
mechanism according to which a country’s absorptive capacity is af-
fected by its  level of human capital. Galor and Moav (2000) did also 
present a model in which non-linearities in the growth process are de-
termined by the interaction of human capital and technological 
change. The basic idea is that an increase in the rate of technical pro-
gress tends to raise the relative demand for skilled labor and, hence, to 
increase the rate of return to private investments in education. The 
subsequent increase in the supply of educated individuals, in turn, acts 
to push technological change further. It is such a dynamic interaction 
between the processes of skill formation and technological upgrading 
that is at the heart of the cumulativeness of aggregate growth trajecto-
ries.  
 
A related idea was proposed by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor 
(2005), whose “unified growth theory” models seek to explain the 
long-run transition of national economies from backward to more ad-
vanced stages of development. These models identify three main de-
velopment stages – a ‘Malthusian’, ‘post-Malthusian’ and a ‘modern 
growth regime’ – and study the mechanisms explaining the transition 
across these long-run phases. In particular, a key insight of these stud-
ies is the observation that during the post-Malthusian phase a demo-
graphic transition occurred. The faster pace of technological change 
progressively increased the returns to human capital accumulation. 
This determined a change in parental attitude towards children’s edu-
cation, favoring a shift from quantity to quality, i.e. a higher prefer-
ence for a small number of well-educated children. The resulting 
slowdown in population growth, in combination with the acceleration 
in human capital and technological accumulation, thus led many 
economies into a modern growth regime characterized by stable 
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growth of per capita incomes. In this development stage framework, 
the existence of different country groups is explained as the outcome 
of different timing of transitions experienced by national economies in 
the shift from the post-Malthusian to the modern growth regime. 
Again, the emergence of thresholds implies that multiple sets of pa-
rameters are needed to describe the convergence processes correctly. 
 
The model by Galor and Tsiddon (1997) is also consistent with this 
view, but it refines the multiple equilibria analysis by studying the in-
teractions between technological progress, intergenerational earnings 
mobility and economic growth. In this overlapping-generations model 
economic agents live two periods. In the first of these, they must de-
cide in what sectors to work and the level of education they seek to 
achieve in the future. As opposed to the previously discussed models, 
economic agents’ human capital dynamics depends here on two main 
factors: their individual ability and their parental sector of employ-
ment (since empirical evidence indicates that earnings possibilities for 
a worker are higher if there is a close match with the parents’ sector of 
employment). In periods of sustained technological progress, individ-
ual ability stands out as the more crucial factor for a worker’s success, 
and high-skills agents tend to cluster in more technologically ad-
vanced sectors. This introduces greater inter-generational mobility in 
the economic system, and the concentration of talented individuals in 
high-tech branches fosters technological change and human capital 
even further. The cross-country implication of this cumulative dynam-
ics is that initial differences in human capital endowments (and in the 
distribution of human capital across sectors) may lead to diverging 
dynamics of national economies. 
 
Howitt (2000) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) refined the 
Schumpeterian growth model by arguing that cross-country differ-
ences in the rates of return to investments in human capital may shape 
the dynamics of absorptive capacity (see Abramovitz (1986) and Basu 
and Weil (1998) for related expositions) and thus generate three dis-
tinct convergence clubs: an innovation, an implementation and a stag-
nation group. The first is rich in terms of both innovative ability and 
absorptive capacity. The second is characterized by a much lower in-
novative capability, but its absorptive capacity is developed enough to 
enable an imitation-based catching up process. The stagnation group is 
instead poor in both aspects, and its distance vis-à-vis the other two 
groups tends to increase over time. Papageorgiou (2002) and Stokke 
(2004) suggest that the ability of a country to shift from the imitation 
to the innovation stage may be affected by the openness of the nation-
al system to international trade. Acemoglu et al. (2006) argue that a 
crucial source of dynamics for countries in the innovation group is 
constituted by the availability of a skilled pool of managers and entre-
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preneurs. The competition and selection process through which skilled 
managers emerge represents a crucial growth mechanism for countries 
that are already close to the technological frontier. 
 
A different explanation for the existence of multiple growth paths is 
provided by Durlauf (1993) and Kelly (2001). Their formalizations 
focus on the dynamics of industrial sectors and the importance of in-
tersectoral linkages to sustain the aggregate dynamics of the economic 
system. The main idea of Durlauf’s (1993) model is that when inter-
sectoral linkages among domestic industries are sufficiently strong, 
the growth of leading sectors propagates rapidly to the whole econo-
my, whereas if such technological complementarities are not intense 
enough the aggregate economy follows a less dynamic growth path. 
Kelly (2001) refined this framework by building up a Schumpeterian 
quality-ladder model in which economies evolve by continuously pro-
ducing new goods and progressively becoming more complex over 
time. Intersectoral linkages tend to become more complex and intense 
as new products are introduced in the economy, and threshold exter-
nalities thus emerge as the result of different degrees of complexity 
that characterize different groups of national economies.  
 
Hausman and Hidalgo (2011) have recently presented a model that 
does also generate a pattern of increasing complexity, explained by 
the fact that the network structure of economic output and countries’ 
export activities becomes more complex over time as economies spe-
cialize in a more differentiated and more advanced set of products. 
Since the quality and complexity of products that a country can pro-
duce and export is closely related to the set of capabilities that charac-
terizes its national system, economies that are below a given threshold 
level of capabilities will not easily be able to upgrade their product 
space and improve their international competitiveness (see also Hidal-
go and Hausman, 2009). 
 
This brief review of the literature on convergence clubs and multiple 
equilibria growth models highlights two facts that provide the main 
motivations for our study. The first fact is that there is a sharp contrast 
between empirical studies and theoretical models in this field. Applied 
works have largely focused on the cross-country dimension – pointing 
out what are the critical factors of success for different groups of 
countries. By contrast, multiple equilibria growth models have adopt-
ed a truly dynamic approach in the attempt to uncover the mechanisms 
that may explain why a given country may (or may not) shift from a 
given development stage to a more advanced club. This contrast be-
tween theoretical and empirical research represents an important gap 
in this literature. We argue that empirical studies of convergence clubs 
and multiple growth regimes should have a more explicitly dynamic 
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focus and adopt time series methods and approaches to a much larger 
extent than it has been the case so far. This is the route we take in this 
paper. 
 
The second fact is that the literature has so far focused on a limited set 
of factors explaining threshold effects and multiple growth regimes, 
and it has in particular given much emphasis to the role of human cap-
ital and its interactions with technological change, and neglected sev-
eral other factors that, interacting with absorptive capacity and innova-
tion, may also determine non-linearities in the growth process (e.g. 
international trade, industrial structure, socio-institutional factors). In 
the attempt to take a broad multi-dimensional view of the determi-
nants of multiple growth patterns, our empirical study will not focus 
solely on one or few growth engines but consider several factors that 
may simultaneously interact and explain the long-run dynamics of 
economic systems. 
 
3. Models and hypotheses 
Our empirical model has three key characteristics: it addresses the dy-
namics, heterogeneity and multi-dimensionality of the growth process. 
Its main objective is to investigate dynamic (time series cointegration) 
relationships among growth factors in a large panel of economies over 
the last three-decade period. It addresses the heterogeneity issue by 
investigating how the model results differ in distinct country groups. 
This is intended to shed new light on the factors that enable a country 
to shift from one development stage to a more advanced one, rather 
than simply comparing the characteristics of different country clubs in 
a static cross-sectional fashion. Finally, the model tackles the multi-
dimensionality issue by simultaneously considering several main driv-
ers of economic growth at different development stages rather than 
focusing on only one or few of them. As such, our empirical model 
does not aim at testing a specific multiple equilibria growth model 
among those noted in the previous section, but it rather provides a 
more general and flexible framework to investigate the empirical va-
lidity of the multiple growth regimes literature in a time-series per-
spective. 
 
The diagram in figure 1 shows a stylized view of our empirical model. 
The growth of GDP per capita over time is linked by a set of two-way 
dynamic relationships to two main sets of dimensions: innovation (at 
the bottom of the diagram) and absorptive capacity (the other five fac-
tors surrounding the economic growth box).  
 
Figure 1: Innovation, absorptive capacity and economic growth 
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Innovation: technological innovation represents the key factor high-
lighted by Schumpeterian growth models, which is assumed to be-
come more and more important as national economies evolve from 
early development stages to more advanced growth clubs. 
 
Absorptive Capacity: this is a broad and composite concept, original-
ly developed by Abramovitz (1986) to denote the wide set of techno-
logical, economic and social factors that shape the ability of a country 
to imitate and absorb foreign advanced technologies. Although the 
concept has been increasingly used, particularly in the Schumpeterian 
growth literature, it is a multifaceted and multidimensional construct, 
and several distinct dimensions may be considered important in shap-
ing a county’s absorptive capacity. Our study points out five factors 
that, individually and in interaction with each other, may explain 
threshold externalities and multiple growth regimes related to the dy-
namics of absorptive capacity. 
 
 Human capital: as noted in section 2, this is the absorptive capaci-
ty variable typically emphasized in the literature on multiple 
growth regimes and convergence clubs (Azariadis and Drazen, 
1990; Galor, 2005). 
 Physical capital: the accumulation of physical capital has tradi-
tionally been singled out as one of the crucial engines of growth in 
neoclassical models. However, it may also play an important role 
in a Schumpeterian perspective since investments in physical capi-
tal enable innovative activities and technology diffusion through 
so-called embodied technical progress. A higher level of physical 
capital and technological infrastructures enable a faster and more 
efficient implementation of foreign advanced technologies. We 
therefore consider it appropriate to include this among the varia-
bles defining the absorptive capacity of a country. 
 Industrial structure: during the development process, national 
economies undergo a process of structural change and industrial 
transformation in which labour and capital resources are gradually 
shifted from low-tech and traditional activities (e.g. agriculture) 
towards more technologically advanced manufacturing and service 
sectors (Durlauf, 1993; Kelly, 2001). A more advanced industrial 
structure does arguably represent an important factor enabling the 
absorption of foreign advanced technologies and their inter-
industry diffusion. 
 International trade: the openness of the economic system repre-
sents an important pre-condition for the international diffusion of 
advanced technologies. When trade openness is matched with the 
other structural factors noted here, a country’s absorptive capacity 
is enhanced and international technology diffusion through the 
import and imitation of foreign advanced technologies emerges as 
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an important driver of economic growth (Papageorgiou, 2002; 
Stokke, 2004). 
 Socio-Institutional context: the quality of institutions and, broadly 
speaking, the social context in which economic relationships un-
fold have been pointed out as a key dimension in recent applied 
growth theory. In a Schumpeterian perspective, in particular, the 
socio-institutional context provides the fundamental building 
block upon which national innovation systems develop over time 
(Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). 
 
Our model investigates the dynamic relationships that link each of 
these variables to economic growth (direct effects on GDP per capita 
dynamics), the interactions and co-evolutionary processes linking to-
gether innovation and absorptive capacity factors (indirect effects on 
the growth process), and it highlights how these direct and indirect 
effects differ along development stages. In line with the literature, and 
in order to provide a simple operationalization of the (admittedly 
complex) concept of development stages, we make use of a standard 
three-group classification: we focus on the three country groups tradi-
tionally defined as less developed economies, middle-income countries 
and advanced economies (as further explained in section 5.1). 
 
We formulate four propositions on the working of our empirical time-
series model in these three country groups. These hypotheses are to a 
large extent based on the theoretical models outlined in section 2, but 
extend them further by highlighting the possible co-existence of a 
complex set of direct and indirect relationships linking innovation, 
absorptive capacity and economic growth. 
 
In the less developed country club, both innovative capabilities and 
the absorptive capacity of nations are typically too low, below a min-
imum threshold level, and they are therefore not likely to emerge as 
important drivers of GDP per capita growth. Income dynamics and 
economic development may instead be fostered by other factors not 
directly related to innovation and absorptive capacity, such as e.g. 
population growth and the availability and use of natural resources 
(factors that are typically unaccounted for in a Schumpeterian model 
framework). The growth of GDP per capita, in turn, may sustain the 
early formation and development of absorptive capacity, i.e. by ena-
bling public investments in physical and human capital, industrial ac-
tivities and institution building.  
 
Proposition 1: In less-developed economies, neither innovation nor 
absorptive capacity is an important driver of GDP per capita dynam-
ics. By contrast, it is income dynamics that sustains the early for-
mation and development of absorptive capacity. 
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As the process of absorptive capacity building proceeds spurred by 
GDP growth, at some point some of the factors that contribute to de-
fine the absorptive capacity of a nation pass a given threshold level, 
after which they increase their pace and start to have a direct feedback 
effect on income per capita dynamics. This is what suggested by the 
threshold externalities models reviewed in section 2. For instance, 
threshold effects may arise in the process of capital accumulation 
(Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Galor, 2005), international trade open-
ness (Papageorgiou, 2002; Stokke, 2004) or industrial upgrading 
(Durlauf, 1993; Kelly, 2001). If such increased dynamics of absorp-
tive capacity sets in, the latter will be linked by a set of two-way dy-
namic relationships to GDP per capita growth. Further, this self-
reinforcing cumulative mechanism and the co-evolutionary dynamics 
of absorptive capacity and income per capita will also enable the de-
velopment of innovative capabilities. As a country undertakes a catch 
up process, private agents and public authorities will increasingly look 
at technological innovation and R&D investments as a key factor to 
sustain their international competitiveness. Private organizations and 
public institutions will therefore start to devote more resources to it. 
 
Proposition 2: In middle-income countries, absorptive capacity and 
GDP per capita growth are linked by a two-way dynamic relation-
ship. In turn, the growth of absorptive capacity sustains the early 
formation and development of innovative capabilities. 
 
As the process of innovation capability building proceeds, a nation 
may reach a threshold level beyond which R&D and innovation in-
vestments emerge as a crucial driver of GDP per capita growth. This 
is what pointed out by recent Schumpeterian threshold growth models 
(Howitt, 2000; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 
2006), and it is also in line with empirical studies of technology clubs 
(Castellacci, 2008; 2011). In this advanced club setting, innovation-
based competition leads to two main changes in the set of dynamic 
relationships driving the growth of economic systems vis-a-vis the 
previous two country groups. On the one hand, innovation dynamics 
feeds back and sustains further the growth of absorptive capacity (e.g. 
human capital, international trade, structural and industrial change), so 
that the two dimensions start to be linked by a two-way dynamic rela-
tionship over time. On the other hand, an analogous process arises for 
the links between innovation and GDP per capita. The former be-
comes an important causal driver of the latter in this advanced country 
club, and the resources generated by income dynamics, in turn, are 
partly reinvested in R&D activities, thus leading to a two-way dynam-
ic and self-reinforcing relationship between innovation and GDP per 
capita growth. 
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Proposition 3: In advanced economies, innovation is linked by a 
two-way dynamic relationship to absorptive capacity, on the one 
hand, and to GDP per capita, on the other. 
 
Propositions 1 to 3 do implicitly tell a story of increasing complexity 
of the economic growth process along subsequent development stages. 
The causal relationships, both direct and indirect, driving GDP per 
capita dynamics in our Schumpeterian model are assumed to be only 
few in the less developed club, and progressively increase and become 
two-directional links as countries move to a middle-income and then 
an advanced stage. So, if the framework illustrated by propositions 1 
to 3 holds true, a more general proposition may be put forward. As 
national economies shift from lower to upper stages of development, 
the complexity of the growth process – as measured by the number of 
causal relationships linking together absorptive capacity, innovation 
and GDP per capita – tends to increase. That is to say, the process of 
economic development entails an increasing level of systemic com-
plexity. 
 
Proposition 4: The complexity of the economic growth process – 
measured by the number of causal relationships linking together 
innovation, absorptive capacity and GDP per capita growth –  in-
creases along the stages of development. 
 
The general idea that economic dynamics is related to the complexity 
of the system is not by itself new. Classical economists as Herbert 
Spencer and Adam Smith put forward this general argument more 
than two centuries ago, and evolutionary economics pointed it out as 
one of the main pillars of evolutionary models of social and economic 
systems (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Castellacci, 2007). Hausman and 
Hidalgo’s (2011) recent model, according to which the network struc-
ture of economic output becomes more complex over time as coun-
tries specialize in a more differentiated and more advanced set of 
products, is also in line with this idea, and proposes a new interpreta-
tion of it based on the relationships between countries’ output struc-
ture and export performance (see also Hidalgo and Hausman, 2009). 
 
While the proposition we argue here is broadly in line with these pre-
vious works, this fourth hypothesis has a specific character and it has 
not been previously formulated as such in the growth literature. Our 
empirical model aims at testing causal dynamic relationships among a 
large set of variables of interest (innovation, absorptive capacity fac-
tors, GDP per capita growth), and then investigate whether the number 
of (statistically significant) causal relationships increases along subse-
quent development stages. The intuition is that – as the production 
structure of countries becomes progressively more complex through 
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processes such as increasing specialization and product and export dif-
ferentiation – this micro- and industry-level complexity (previously 
analysed in the literature) will be reflected in the network of economic 
relationships that characterizes each national system. Countries with a 
more advanced production and output structure will in general be 
characterized by a more dense network of (Granger) causal relation-
ships linking together the main variables of interests. 
4. Data and indicators 
The empirical analysis makes use of the CANA database, a newly re-
leased cross-country panel dataset containing a large number of indi-
cators for the period 1980-2008 (Castellacci and Natera, 2011). The 
novelty of the database is that it provides full information for the 
whole set of country-year observations, i.e. it contains no missing val-
ue. The dataset has been constructed by combining together indicators 
available from a number of existing cross-country data sources, and 
then applying the method of multiple imputation recently proposed by 
Honaker and King (2010). The CANA database, along with the 
sources and definitions of the indicators and a description of the con-
struction methodology, can be downloaded at the web address: 
http://cana.grinei.es. 
 
Specifically, this paper considers a sample of 116 countries (listed in 
Appendix 1) and a set of 11 selected indicators, which are listed as 
follows. 
 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita, purchasing power parity. 
 
Innovation: Number of patents registered at the USPTO per million 
people. 
 
Absorptive Capacity:  
 Human capital: Secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios. 
 Physical capital: Gross fixed capital formation, percentage of 
GDP. 
 Industrial structure: Agriculture, manufacturing and services val-
ue added, percentage of GDP. 
 International trade: Openness: (Import + Export) / GDP. 
 Socio-Institutional context: We make use of two indicators: (1) 
The GINI Index as a measure of a country’s economic inequalities 
and cohesion; (2) The Corruption Perception Index as an indicator 
of the quality and functioning of institutions.  
5. Methods 
Our empirical methodology consists of three steps, each of which cor-
responds to the three salient features of the model highlighted in sec-
tion 2: heterogeneity, dynamics and multi-dimensionality. The first 
step points out different groups of countries belonging to the three de-
velopment stages (less-developed, middle-income and advanced 
economies). The second investigates, for each country group, dynamic 
relationships among the variables of interest over the last three-decade 
period through panel cointegration analysis and Granger causality 
tests. The third step defines a set of model specifications where, in or-
der to tackle the multi-dimensionality of the growth process, different 
indicators are used for the time-series tests. 
5.1 Heterogeneity: Identification of country clubs  
Our analysis will investigate dynamic (cointegration) relationships in 
a large panel of economies, and it is well known that cross-country 
heterogeneity may turn out to affect the results of dynamic panel 
model estimations (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). There is however no 
easy solution to this methodological issue. Estimating the model for 
each country separately would avoid the heterogeneity problem, but 
this approach is not feasible in our exercise because the relatively 
short length of the time series does not allow a reliable estimation of 
our model for each individual country in the sample. A more appro-
priate and convenient solution is instead to divide the sample into dif-
ferent groups, and estimate the panel cointegration model separately 
for each of these country groups. This strategy alleviates the heteroge-
neity issue while at the same time retaining the advantages of panel 
estimations. 
 
We have chosen to cluster countries in a hierarchical two-step manner. 
First, we identify three major country clubs, which are broadly in line 
with the models discussed in section 2: advanced economies, middle-
income countries and less developed economies (Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes, 2005; Castellacci and Archibugi, 2008). Secondly, in order to 
achieve a finer characterization of the widely different nature of econ-
omies within these three heterogenous clubs, we further divide them 
into a few sub-groups. We make this based on an exogenous and intui-
tive criterion: we follow broad geographical areas, which on the whole 
group together countries that are similar with respect to both the initial 
GDP per capita level (the typical clustering variable in this literature) 
and the overall socio-institutional context and capitalist mode of de-
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velopment1. All in all, we end up with a total of seven sub-groups, de-
fined as follows (see Appendix 1 for a list of countries included in 
each group): 
 
 Less developed countries: (1) Sub-Saharan Africa; (2) South 
Asia; (3) North Africa and Middle-East. 
 
 Middle-income economies: (4) Eurasia (former Soviet countries); 
(5) Latin America; (6) East Asia. 
 
 Advanced economies: (7) OECD countries.  
 
The advantage of the intuitive clustering method described here is 
twofold: it is broadly in line with the three-club specification adopted 
by most theoretical models in this field, and at the same time, by 
working with seven internally homogenous sub-groups, it deals in a 
satisfactory manner with the cross-country heterogeneity issue. 
5.2 Dynamics: Investigation of causal relationships over time 
The second step of our empirical analysis is to investigate the set of 
dynamic relationships between the main variables of interest and the 
direction of causality of each of these. For this purpose, we make use 
of panel cointegration analysis and Granger causality tests, and apply 
these in each of the seven country groups noted above. 
 
Cointegration analysis is a useful tool to analyse the relationships be-
tween non-stationary time series by looking both at their long-run 
equilibrium relationship as well as the process of short-run adjustment 
(Engle and Granger, 1987).2 The extension of this time series ap-
proach to a panel data context is relatively recent (see overview in 
Breitung and Pesaran, 2008). The use of panel datasets, by increasing 
substantially the number of observations in the sample, makes it pos-
sible to strengthen the power of cointegration tests, while at the same 
time considering the issue of cross-country heterogeneity by including 
fixed effects and country-specific trends in the econometric specifica-
tion. 
 
The methodology adopted in this second phase of our empirical analy-
sis consists of four steps. First, since cointegration analysis can by 
definition only be used to study the relationships between time series 
                                                 
1  We have also tried several different sub-groups specifications based on the results of hier-
archical cluster analysis (most of which are closely related and very similar to the groups 
presented here). 
2  If two or more variables are integrated of the same order (e.g. they are both I(1) series), 
there might exist a linear combination of them whose residuals are stationary – in other 
words the two series are not stationary but one (or more) linear combination of them is. If 
this is the case, the variables are said to be cointegrated. 
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variables that have the same order of integration, we start by carrying 
out a battery of unit root tests (Levin, Lin and Chu; Breitung; Im, Pe-
saran and Shin; augmented Dickey-Fuller; Phillips-Perron), in order to 
make sure that our variables are stationary after removing the time 
trend by first-differencing (i.e. they are I(1) series). 
 
Secondly, we test the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships 
between our variables of interest by means of the Johansen cointegra-
tion test, which adopts Trace Test and Maximun Likelihood specifica-
tions to determine the number of cointegrating relationships. We re-
peated both the first and the second step for 9 different lags (from 1 to 
9), in order to make sure that the results are robust and not too sensi-
tive to the lag specification that is used for each test (which is a well-
known problem for this type of time series analyses).  
 
The third step is the estimation of a vector error correction model 
(VECM). This model is useful because it makes it possible to estimate 
both the (long-run) equilibrium relationship among the variables as 
well as the (short-run) adjustment process by which they respond to 
external shocks that deviate from their long-run equilibrium path. In 
our paper, though, the focus is not to uncover long-run equilibrium 
relationships but rather to point out causal dynamic relationships. 
Therefore, we will not present the results of the VECM as such, but 
rather use the VECM model to test for causal relationships in the 
fourth and crucial step of our methodology. 
 
The fourth step is to investigate the direction of causality, i.e. to ana-
lyse whether the relationships previously identified between each pair 
of variables Yt and Xt is a uni-directional type of causality (Yt → Xt, 
or Yt ← Xt) or rather bi-directional (Yt ↔ Xt). This is done by making 
use of Granger causality analysis, i.e. by carrying out, for each pair of 
variables included in the VECM model (and for each of the seven 
country groups), a Granger block exogeneity test.3 Since the results of 
Granger causality analysis are typically quite sensitive to the lag spec-
ification that is adopted, for each pair of variables we, once more, car-
ry out block exogeneity tests for 9 different lags (from 1 to 9), and we 
only consider reliable those results for which we obtain significant 
evidence of a causal relationship for at least five of the nine lag speci-
fications. 
 
The panel cointegration methodology that we have adopted enables to 
investigate the direct and indirect causal effects from innovation and 
absorptive capacity to economic growth. A direct relationship emerg-
                                                 
3  Granger (1984) proposed a method to determine if changes in one variable could impact 
(predict) the performance in time of another variable of interest. We might say that there 
exist Granger-causality when lagged values of a variable, Xt have explanatory power in a 
regression of a variable Yt on lagged values of Yt and Xt . 
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es when a given explanatory variable X (innovation or absorptive ca-
pacity) has a direct causal impact on GDP per capita growth. An indi-
rect relationship exists when a given variable X (e.g. innovation) af-
fects another explanatory variable Y (e.g. absorptive capacity), and the 
latter does in turn have an impact on GDP per capita dynamics. By 
using Grange Causality tests, we study not only the factors that are 
important drivers of GDP dynamics at each development stage (the 
reduced form of the growth model) but also how these engines of 
growth are related to each other and evolve along the development 
process (the structural form of the growth model).4 
5.3 Multi-dimensionality: Different model specifications 
The third methodological issue we face is multi-dimensionality: many 
different factors may simultaneously be relevant, and distinct varia-
bles may represent good indicators in a development stage but not in 
others (e.g. secondary vs. tertiary education; agriculture, industry and 
service shares of GDP). We have therefore specified 14 different 
model specifications and run our panel cointegration analysis in each 
of them. Table 1 reports a summary. 
 
 
                                                 
4  White and Lu (2010) have recently provided an analysis of the relationships between 
Granger causality analysis and dynamic structural systems, and shown that Granger caus-
al relationships may in fact be interpreted as structural relationships characterizing the 
system if the so-called conditional exogeneity condition holds. White and Lu (2010)’s 
analysis provides an important complement to the empirical approach that it is adopted in 
this paper, as well as all previous studies that aimed at deriving structural dynamic rela-
tionships based on the results of Granger causality analysis. 
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Table 1: Summary of model specifications.  
Dependent variable: GDP per capita 
 
Model Innovation 
Physical Capi-
tal 
Human  
Capital 
Industrial 
Structure 
International 
Trade 
Socio-
Institutional 
Context 
1 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Tertiary 
Education 
Service Openness GINI 
2 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Tertiary 
Education 
Service Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
3 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Service Openness GINI 
4 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Service Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
5 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Tertiary 
Education 
Total 
Industry* 
Openness GINI 
6 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Tertiary 
Education 
Total 
Industry* 
Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
7 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Total 
Industry* 
Openness GINI 
8 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Total 
Industry* 
Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
9 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Tertiary 
Education 
Manufacturing Openness GINI 
10 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Tertiary 
Education 
Manufacturing Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
11 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Manufacturing Openness GINI 
12 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Manufacturing Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
13 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Agriculture Openness GINI 
14 Patents 
Gross Fixed 
Capital Forma-
tion 
Secondary 
Education 
Agriculture Openness 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
*Total industry: Manufacturing, mining, construction and public utilities
6. Empirical results 
Before presenting the results of the tests of the four hypotheses out-
lined in section 3, let us briefly summarize the results of the first three 
steps of our empirical methodology, which are preparatory phases for 
the fourth and crucial step of the analysis (Granger causality analysis). 
First, we have run a large battery of panel unit root tests (Levin, Lin & 
Chu; Breitung; Im, Pesaran & Shin; ADF; PP), each of which was re-
peated for all the variables included in the model and for nine different 
lag specifications. The results are not included in the paper to save 
space, but are included in an online Appendix that contains additional 
material and empirical results. The panel unit root tests indicate con-
sistently that, in our 116 countries panel sample for the period 1980 to 
2008, all the variables of interest for our analysis are I(1) series (trend 
stationary), thus confirming that it is correct to apply a panel cointe-
gration and VECM methodology.  
 
The second step was to carry out a set of Johansen cointegration tests, 
which analyse the existence of cointegration relationships among the 
variables. Again, each Johansen test was repeated for nine different 
lags in order to check for the robustness of the results. Table 2 pre-
sents the results of some selected cointegration tests. Most Johansen 
tests, including those not reported in table 2, provide evidence sug-
gesting the existence of (at least) one long-run cointegration relation-
ship linking together GDP per capita, on the one hand, and the set of 
innovation and absorptive capacity variables, on the other.  
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Table 2: Summary of (selected) Johansen cointegration tests 
 
  Less developed economies    
        Johansen Tests 
  Group Model Lag Trace Statistic 
Maximun-Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
  Sub-Sahara 8 4 56.69616*** 31.53753** 
  North Africa and Middle-East 8 7 140.2898*** 51.33442** 
  South Asia 14 7 160.6065*** 46.82462*** 
 
  Middle-income group          
        Johansen Tests 
  Group Model Lag Trace Statistic 
Maximun-Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
  Eurasia 8 6 47.86217** 42.48968** 
  Latin America 2 6 82.88312*** 35.66159** 
  East Asia 2 6 125.7114** 52.01002** 
            
  Advanced club          
        Johansen Tests 
  Group Model Lag Trace Statistic 
Maximun-Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
  OECD 2 3 113.2632*** 38.10318*** 
            
 
Thirdly, we estimated a vector error correction model (VECM), where 
GDP per capita growth is the dependent variable and innovation and 
absorptive capacity factors are the explanatory variables (see the 14 
model specifications previously reported in table 1). As noted in sec-
tion 5, though, we will not report detailed results of the VECM esti-
mations here. The reason is that our main objective is not to uncover 
long-run equilibrium relationships through the VECM results, but ra-
ther to point out causal dynamic relationships. Therefore, we have 
used the VECM estimation results only as a preparatory step to derive 
the Granger causal tests that represent the main step of our empirical 
analysis.5 
                                                 
5  An interesting pattern emerging from the panel cointegration and VECM estimations is 
that the results are more stable and robust in the advanced club panel of economies, and 
less so in the other two groups (and particularly the less-developed one). This pattern is 
reasonable and in line with the main idea of the development stages and multiple equilib-
ria models considered in this paper. Long-run equilibrium relationships (as identified in a 
panel cointegration and VECM context) are stable only in the OECD country group, be-
cause this is the club of countries that has already undergone its long-run process of trans-
formation and economic development for a long period of time. By contrast, less devel-
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The fourth and crucial step of the analysis was to carry out, for each 
pair of variables included in the VECM model (and for each of the 
seven country groups), a Granger block exogeneity test. Since the re-
sults of Granger causality analysis are typically quite sensitive to the 
lag specification that is adopted, for each pair of variables we have run 
block exogeneity tests for 9 different lags (from 1 to 9), and have only 
considered reliable those results for which we obtain significant evi-
dence of a causal relationship for at least five out of the nine lag speci-
fications. Thus, the presentation of these results below here will only 
rely on what we consider to be robust causal relationships, and disre-
gard all other results that are not stable across different lags and model 
specifications. 
 
All in all, we have run a very large number of Granger tests, evaluat-
ing the causal relationship between all pairs of variables for 14 model 
specifications, 9 lag specifications, and 7 country panels. Tables 3.1 to 
3.7 present the results of Granger causality analysis for each of the 
seven country groups. In these tables, the first panel reports results of 
direct effects of our set of explanatory variables on GDP per capita 
growth (and related feedback effects from income dynamics to the ex-
planatory variables), whereas the second panel reports results of the 
interactions between these various factors (from which we may infer 
the existence of indirect effects of these variables on GDP dynamics).  
 
Figures 2.a, 2.b and 2.c provide a graphical summary of these Granger 
results for each of the seven country groups. In these diagrams, we 
draw arrows linking the various variables on the basis of the Granger 
results reported in tables 3.1 to 3.7. To illustrate, we draw a uni-
directional (bi-directional) arrow between, say, the variables X and Y 
if there is a significant uni-directional (bi-directional) Granger causal 
relationship linking the two factors for at least five out of the nine lag-
specifications we have considered. We will now use these graphical 
summaries to discuss the results of our propositions 1, 2 and 3 respec-
tively.  
6.1 Less developed economies 
Sub-Sahara: In this panel of countries, we do not find any direct 
causal relationship from innovation or absorptive capacity variables to 
GDP per capita growth (see figure 2.a). By contrast, it is income dy-
namics that fosters the early development of absorptive capacity, par-
ticularly through its impacts on socio-institutional building and indus-
trial upgrading (e.g. the shifting from agriculture to industrial activi-
                                                 
oped and middle-income economies, which are still in a transition process towards higher 
development stages, are characterized by unstable and out-of-equilibrium long-run devel-
opment paths. 
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ties). The industrial structure variable, in turn, feeds back and sustains 
the growth of physical capital, human capital and international trade. 
Hence, the absorptive capacity variables are related to each other and 
co-evolve over time, although they do not yet have any direct causal 
impact on GDP per capita growth. 
 
North Africa and Middle-East: Similarly to the previous group, the 
panel Granger results for this bunch of oil-rich countries show that 
none of the explanatory variables considered in our model has a direct 
effect on GDP dynamics, while the latter has a causal impact on both 
international trade openness and the industrial structure variable. In-
novation and physical capital dynamics are linked by a two-way rela-
tionship, e.g. explained by embodied technical progress in the accu-
mulation of physical capital; the latter, in turn, fosters the openness of 
the system to international trade. The other absorptive capacity varia-
bles, such as human capital and the socio-institutional context, are in-
stead not significantly connected to the dynamics of the national sys-
tem.   
 
South Asia: Similarly to the previous two groups, industrial structure 
(agriculture and industry shares of GDP) turns out to be a central vari-
able in the system: its growth is affected by the dynamics of the socio-
institutional system (indirectly) and international trade (directly); in 
turn, the dynamics of industrial structure has a direct causal impact on 
GDP per capita growth. The latter has also a feedback effect on capital 
accumulation (physical and human capital), thus fostering absorptive 
capacity and the variables enabling growth and catching up. By con-
trast, innovation does not emerge as an important factor, and its dy-
namics is not significantly connected to the rest of the system.  
 
Proposition 1: Although the three groups of less-developed econo-
mies are characterized by slightly different causal relationships, a 
summary overview of the results reported in figure 2.a provides clear 
support for the first general proposition that we have put forward in 
section 3. In less-developed economies, neither innovation nor absorp-
tive capacity turns out to be an important driver of GDP per capita dy-
namics. By contrast, it is income dynamics that sustains the early for-
mation and development of absorptive capacity, particularly through 
its effects on industrial structure and international trade. The growth 
of these variables prepares the conditions for the shift to a more ad-
vanced development stage in the future. 
 
Table 3.1: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Less developed economies: Sub-Sahara (Model 8) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 0.90457 1.206621 1.210754 1.578513 1.273707 2.236612 4.727079 6.275985 11.56453 No
GDP per Capita → Innovation 0.000356 1.192403 1.315193 1.566481 1.543766 1.060075 1.99615 2.57383 6.040832 No
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 0.570164 0.238241 0.832908 1.534044 1.229891 2.560381 2.609636 6.425536 5.755627 No
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 0.027551 1.711128 2.558728 2.675835 4.248295 5.518605 4.762332 2.86976 2.370524 No
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 0.033708 0.762349 0.389752 2.078991 3.367356 5.75651 7.718596 8.977341 8.82737 No
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 3.099715 * 4.701964 * 8.212917 ** 4.735884 5.041619 5.228478 7.138237 12.19365 8.801677 No
International Trade → GDP per Capita 2.048575 5.12358 * 5.215547 5.595808 6.438542 6.94613 6.791625 4.665829 8.112171 No
GDP per Capita → International Trade 0.354397 0.905963 2.468809 3.959785 2.472982 2.557748 9.697213 10.90164 11.64208 No
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 0.191923 0.360664 0.564006 1.435213 3.01926 4.7465 3.602943 4.421057 9.925446 No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 3.22554 * 11.06727 *** 15.6199 *** 29.21999 *** 26.515 *** 26.58817 *** 25.78825 *** 26.66649 *** 27.65223 *** Yes
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 0.00851 3.075278 2.240457 4.430477 3.631871 7.723062 9.216293 11.11288 16.80196 * No
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 8.934729 *** 10.33969 *** 17.81301 *** 16.12624 *** 16.39718 *** 17.03063 *** 15.1531 ** 17.00507 ** 17.54398 ** Yes
Causal relationships
Lags Granger 
Causality
I. Interactions with GDP per capita
Less developed economies - Sub-Sahara (Model 8)
 
 
Table 3.1: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Less developed economies: Sub-Sahara (Model 8) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 0.190535 0.08689 0.344799 2.091178 2.385417 2.860859 2.784964 1.392827 1.241523 No
Innovation → Physical Capital 0.034465 0.114783 0.288404 0.26213 0.861125 2.454565 3.491427 3.255139 5.144993 No
Human Capital → Innovation 0.138383 5.731186 * 5.557958 9.201586 * 8.956021 13.02347 ** 14.66359 ** 20.50836 *** 17.74196 ** Yes
Innovation → Human Capital 1.647035 0.882806 0.677799 0.90184 5.776438 5.731787 8.318363 13.44128 * 14.48545 No
International Trade → Innovation 0.625511 2.691345 3.299228 5.106213 6.282996 6.318259 4.963434 6.408067 8.862463 No
Innovation → International Trade 0.055626 0.126149 0.538542 0.943695 2.628277 3.610237 2.299762 3.95731 7.242077 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 0.392476 1.749598 1.148175 1.029885 1.333979 1.541998 2.665433 1.555668 1.328599 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 0.014955 0.137308 1.715558 2.225702 2.229576 0.587571 2.331685 2.393683 5.050581 No
Industrial Structure → Innovation 0.041531 0.205398 1.225477 0.838045 1.851058 3.364391 3.947238 1.857165 3.330412 No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 1.145107 6.549609 ** 6.722013 * 6.913842 8.916439 8.46799 9.032505 8.804885 12.1937 No
Human Capital → Physical Capital 0.051454 2.647065 2.996711 3.194107 2.896364 6.101261 6.583588 4.383362 3.884395 No
Physical Capital → Human Capital 0.834877 5.65363 * 1.772079 3.720359 4.194373 3.961058 2.342982 2.217802 2.729325 No
International Trade → Physical Capital 0.751321 0.984111 0.944942 2.238698 2.774074 3.250616 3.755484 3.374211 3.533968 No
Physical Capital → International Trade 0.702882 0.980747 1.766597 5.309642 5.777631 6.427735 4.761452 5.859736 8.003933 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 5.744362 ** 11.68542 *** 10.67887 ** 13.91437 *** 11.9691 ** 12.83833 ** 18.07177 ** 20.79175 *** 20.71454 ** Yes
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.001069 2.538829 4.568987 4.359003 2.97605 5.161383 5.87387 6.117344 7.40053 No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 4.145807 ** 10.32551 *** 7.015275 * 8.379655 * 10.15659 * 8.999706 10.15735 9.108257 10.75511 Yes
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 1.338648 0.539624 0.45874 1.878587 1.919063 2.07663 3.422584 4.086736 17.45847 ** No
International Trade → Human Capital 1.066891 7.658104 ** 5.568751 6.317423 11.35518 ** 19.11221 *** 18.25506 ** 21.77326 *** 27.28957 *** Yes
Human Capital → International Trade 1.09004 4.526455 6.38783 * 8.596058 * 7.218557 15.997 ** 16.00067 ** 9.022262 16.61123 * Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 0.183864 0.379589 1.266804 1.260537 1.594363 2.691548 2.333453 4.760746 4.859915 No
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.058565 0.696531 0.618808 2.093245 2.286449 4.343237 3.519115 6.149149 11.43616 No
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 0.207236 0.345817 17.24105 *** 18.52266 *** 22.59465 *** 22.40453 *** 24.83093 *** 21.74926 *** 24.62428 *** Yes
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 0.146882 2.108814 3.513176 7.550218 4.025235 4.772692 7.157845 7.328827 8.22055 No
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 1.108662 0.987912 0.675515 5.599859 6.349338 6.072641 2.872325 2.59303 5.04484 No
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 0.063521 2.65569 3.418691 3.019362 3.200841 6.868775 5.593382 13.07497 17.83866 ** No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 4.271296 ** 2.663105 5.587932 20.15876 *** 19.56881 *** 22.74168 *** 15.51655 ** 16.36934 ** 17.77747 ** Yes
International Trade → Industrial Structure 0.549747 1.377636 6.79862 * 6.941725 10.0202 * 6.653187 8.182345 7.422474 9.725844 No
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 0.138583 0.599667 0.923664 1.027959 3.362198 6.671717 8.780176 9.670171 12.25693 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 1.507711 2.074118 2.086262 1.037138 2.379411 4.831376 7.805089 7.545729 13.55305 No
Less developed economies - Sub-Sahara (Model 8)
Causal relationships
Lags Granger 
Causality
II. Interactions among the explanatory variables of GDP per capita
 Table 3.2: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Less developed economies: North Africa and Middle-East (Model 8) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 1.385946 0.754615 6.695217 * 4.927574 1.798842 1.828328 2.332995 5.715785 11.78789 No
GDP per Capita → Innovation 0.03497 0.176621 0.228708 0.352803 0.835722 4.355208 10.05813 7.50954 9.745742 No
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 0.608461 1.146651 2.933708 2.772474 3.899418 4.045931 5.372889 6.22815 9.051403 No
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 0.400594 1.111192 0.606656 3.474263 3.250976 1.771812 8.515135 7.045444 6.710405 No
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 7.106611 *** 4.396641 5.303259 9.035262 * 10.8305 * 7.514148 6.989557 10.87934 17.25001 ** No
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 1.183191 1.204812 2.032746 1.681112 3.350784 3.582717 5.349046 4.319078 9.984384 No
International Trade → GDP per Capita 0.348434 1.367531 1.199427 3.56054 4.711284 6.148853 6.36346 4.563893 9.179508 No
GDP per Capita → International Trade 0.213061 2.681761 2.574704 4.091378 14.03831 ** 14.21928 ** 13.76164 * 22.87377 *** 18.47732 ** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 0.224871 1.035399 3.632446 1.083633 6.831444 4.261778 4.827209 9.599 10.90912 No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 0.445309 1.341489 3.479309 3.779364 3.204135 5.592008 8.110526 4.509258 20.97014 ** No
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 0.257092 1.120842 6.367567 * 6.309421 10.31116 * 7.565041 4.761296 5.266363 11.48308 No
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 3.112715 * 4.677821 * 5.481596 11.09981 ** 14.20811 ** 21.43228 *** 19.27881 *** 29.1756 *** 38.70248 *** Yes
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Table 3.2: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Less developed economies: North Africa and Middle-East (Model 8) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 3.218136 * 9.121041 ** 7.308066 * 9.247456 * 11.35528 ** 9.972831 13.56931 * 10.4975 15.5361 * Yes
Innovation → Physical Capital 3.138759 * 5.196255 * 4.533366 13.89927 *** 23.55037 *** 21.84295 *** 20.28313 *** 17.37159 ** 17.75112 ** Yes
Human Capital → Innovation 0.087943 0.13423 0.388583 0.994019 1.840336 3.762397 7.626367 6.520583 5.764886 No
Innovation → Human Capital 0.625169 0.239023 0.46841 1.900494 3.856428 2.449583 4.503256 3.395243 5.139403 No
International Trade → Innovation 2.898165 * 3.421967 2.83635 3.470853 4.628983 5.597855 9.858231 6.333247 12.36935 No
Innovation → International Trade 1.062458 1.851794 1.920642 2.018783 4.442231 8.387488 9.331726 19.87622 ** 9.07759 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 4.917635 ** 3.160827 3.071252 3.836997 4.735708 2.324374 3.566068 4.55078 11.80106 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 0.134145 0.348767 0.638946 0.792318 1.165142 2.409826 2.061729 3.857053 4.560625 No
Industrial Structure → Innovation 4.318975 ** 4.957259 * 4.516353 5.323909 5.708628 4.798544 6.957053 8.274473 14.28746 No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 1.365818 1.135334 0.782726 1.945045 2.165033 3.280945 2.95427 12.14634 17.16584 ** No
Human Capital → Physical Capital 0.008714 1.378509 0.486342 4.958902 6.893767 11.52208 * 14.48801 ** 11.97812 10.54193 No
Physical Capital → Human Capital 1.823459 3.242102 5.05151 5.084135 2.715436 1.489464 5.005894 6.550511 6.909972 No
International Trade → Physical Capital 0.014737 3.175108 3.370503 3.218859 5.503387 4.880256 9.497399 7.863485 10.23473 No
Physical Capital → International Trade 3.717601 * 6.863077 ** 5.293247 9.061507 * 8.780366 11.36869 * 15.06482 ** 34.7846 *** 15.65521 * Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 0.063895 1.552075 3.558425 2.453569 4.226848 5.121068 7.863796 7.34174 7.057083 No
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.728952 1.031914 0.711436 3.114462 2.199506 8.168691 12.38898 * 7.79261 18.38669 ** No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 3.613065 * 8.741874 ** 7.596699 * 9.392522 * 8.306965 8.699294 7.882906 4.80091 5.401535 No
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 1.549584 7.882401 ** 5.723123 7.130268 6.845327 8.573387 8.345182 23.94224 *** 13.37208 No
International Trade → Human Capital 1.284856 1.528321 1.373328 1.24004 1.821534 3.86209 6.627091 8.478413 11.63539 No
Human Capital → International Trade 0.328986 1.163605 1.013403 1.927536 6.541667 7.172582 8.352948 13.87257 * 12.99538 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 0.070449 0.112166 1.419275 1.494725 4.720872 5.885145 5.139558 7.56518 5.855125 No
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.712005 0.753877 1.941164 2.54035 2.698697 2.851676 8.97256 5.243171 14.83411 * No
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 1.56368 0.788166 2.079053 1.775255 2.257139 3.530493 4.299356 5.974842 15.35262 * No
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 2.688581 3.279567 4.010901 4.165493 3.456551 11.4493 * 10.32595 18.13836 ** 4.543275 No
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 0.074242 0.123238 0.424814 0.302845 1.439208 4.102616 6.522232 7.442094 6.352051 No
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 1.24473 1.388051 2.640378 4.824636 7.181537 11.40066 * 13.19856 * 10.2646 8.153351 No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 0.933485 2.317157 4.70802 12.63329 ** 13.42117 ** 15.17186 ** 14.89434 ** 41.03825 *** 7.434249 Yes
International Trade → Industrial Structure 1.241977 3.657104 2.487957 2.608351 6.873136 10.74485 * 9.725032 7.850404 10.38856 No
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 0.779542 1.028965 2.476175 2.554499 2.23598 2.991304 2.730677 4.953171 22.22638 *** No
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 1.521366 0.944193 2.547654 3.499519 3.980962 7.840967 8.017127 13.31557 13.11074 No
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Table 3.3: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Less developed economies: South Asia (Model 14) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 0.045471 0.428295 1.346413 3.31161 4.028747 2.744319 2.103434 8.875933 24.31978 *** No
GDP per Capita → Innovation 1.193939 4.246948 7.33789 * 3.292284 7.460078 6.527441 6.930804 10.32234 13.55261 No
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 0.804661 1.182975 0.480134 4.065666 7.003098 5.826429 5.452782 2.555737 27.82276 *** No
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 11.23268 *** 7.572216 ** 7.938598 ** 13.14136 ** 27.18601 *** 24.52526 *** 20.09686 *** 19.36954 ** 19.27137 ** Yes
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 2.683724 3.612153 4.210346 5.567571 5.300955 7.115727 8.504152 10.74974 30.09979 *** No
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 0.044599 1.450291 2.955305 3.5223 9.393901 * 10.81511 * 9.621303 10.22689 6.557211 No
International Trade → GDP per Capita 0.306259 1.971628 1.699404 4.170539 5.061469 6.604135 5.832794 12.31904 47.13245 *** No
GDP per Capita → International Trade 0.282398 2.724942 2.050835 2.302599 2.725546 24.05527 *** 10.47669 47.37567 *** 22.82984 *** No
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 2.496281 4.525938 3.860554 2.364132 2.796084 4.684157 5.082778 11.20522 29.50397 *** No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 0.131651 2.617192 3.206868 4.012937 1.054595 1.056197 13.12414 * 2.97897 7.084046 No
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 6.462563 ** 6.314053 ** 5.455973 14.581 *** 11.84112 ** 14.25534 ** 9.96932 15.66687 ** 63.63064 *** Yes
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 0.908086 1.46074 0.764474 4.954181 9.33102 * 10.74885 * 6.781247 6.935682 3.459971 No
Less developed economies - South Asia (Model 14)
Causal relationships
Lags Granger 
Causality
I. Interactions with GDP per capita
 
Table 3.3: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Less developed economies: South Asia (Model 14) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 3.481739 * 7.164369 ** 5.419343 5.493622 8.18625 6.944668 13.79825 * 9.532415 19.90303 ** No
Innovation → Physical Capital 0.381976 9.202874 ** 8.679667 ** 7.662951 14.0824 ** 15.6255 ** 10.32547 10.71065 8.281523 No
Human Capital → Innovation 0.009367 0.244558 3.394512 2.030665 5.206642 5.513539 5.470039 5.343054 8.599204 No
Innovation → Human Capital 1.915028 1.740907 2.176548 3.131307 4.893699 2.683128 9.017203 3.678913 3.415388 No
International Trade → Innovation 0.017422 2.136566 1.93347 1.779916 5.20656 4.710672 4.504451 6.672 8.692971 No
Innovation → International Trade 0.012087 1.72966 3.130769 2.408065 3.552257 22.7552 *** 8.274837 41.83588 *** 18.5813 ** No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 0.059933 0.617119 1.912289 2.89213 5.368715 5.79411 6.881264 7.650081 12.43172 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 0.254005 0.631573 1.65787 2.678067 2.3548 2.36728 4.672253 2.818328 8.256058 No
Industrial Structure → Innovation 0.016572 0.961114 1.519593 3.952063 7.460193 7.207773 15.79371 ** 13.0317 20.2677 ** No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 0.000932 2.355524 3.370104 5.968288 7.155563 5.074853 4.243854 5.050503 2.738793 No
Human Capital → Physical Capital 0.619795 1.181805 1.764525 3.331115 5.653544 8.591483 10.78851 12.22849 9.836889 No
Physical Capital → Human Capital 0.878574 1.180397 0.879394 2.55462 5.970343 7.818448 11.9316 7.443226 7.163603 No
International Trade → Physical Capital 5.316624 ** 7.831149 ** 7.025997 * 7.392503 17.41474 *** 18.95111 *** 23.69521 *** 17.09536 ** 15.8742 * Yes
Physical Capital → International Trade 0.287794 0.926323 3.704151 2.325588 1.441127 10.62259 4.526057 25.31059 *** 5.383755 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 0.004157 0.418745 2.709417 3.839674 4.239884 8.47216 6.433398 7.306609 5.506432 No
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.048196 0.247347 0.34806 0.532358 0.792866 1.783595 4.922628 6.018633 15.63545 * No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 0.503673 7.629635 ** 7.371942 * 2.752145 6.414911 4.146715 14.8484 ** 7.77529 5.856366 No
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 7.601233 *** 9.413033 *** 8.770462 ** 10.36819 ** 8.23693 7.919626 10.83869 10.29532 9.096117 No
International Trade → Human Capital 2.977136 * 4.709771 * 2.98623 1.724384 1.243253 13.37727 ** 12.24843 * 10.25993 5.402 No
Human Capital → International Trade 0.31019 0.679478 0.143569 1.198862 0.864593 17.74388 *** 11.09403 30.76822 *** 10.49131 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 2.266639 3.106384 3.565371 5.600068 2.117948 4.882525 8.4889 6.462684 3.877858 No
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 3.056166 * 3.808036 6.366492 * 5.23074 6.586254 9.28663 9.313357 7.288773 19.39581 ** No
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 0.073775 0.238798 0.507985 1.001085 1.020377 3.664718 9.732689 5.599901 2.376434 No
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 2.308058 1.66186 0.746028 3.310963 4.055108 2.272246 2.690949 4.745891 5.991614 No
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 0.148372 6.300154 ** 6.890179 * 8.184914 * 11.61481 ** 28.11397 *** 15.04037 ** 60.40552 *** 23.59485 *** Yes
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 0.073007 2.725868 2.447569 3.042372 4.06153 7.475489 17.09809 ** 7.388314 18.11494 ** No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 0.491241 4.020271 4.496767 3.386743 4.977984 10.09473 12.55755 * 16.48109 ** 11.03114 No
International Trade → Industrial Structure 2.427324 6.549249 ** 12.40195 *** 11.06807 ** 10.15283 * 11.71894 * 8.680311 9.235647 5.362538 Yes
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 0.067816 4.381092 3.230378 3.247948 2.617297 3.009222 12.46011 * 11.16323 17.68859 ** No
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 0.168914 0.219645 0.388208 0.431105 1.527022 2.02947 2.324761 1.619684 4.856388 No
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Figure 2.a: Summary of causal relationships (selected models – Less developed economies 
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6.2 Middle-income group 
Eurasia: In the group of former Communist economies, income per 
capita dynamics is driven by physical capital accumulation, interna-
tional trade and human capital. In turn, GDP growth fosters the further 
building of absorptive capacity factors such as industrial structure, 
human capital and trade openness. The innovation variable is not sig-
nificantly related to any other variable in the system. 
 
East Asia: GDP per capita growth is in this group driven by the dy-
namics of industrial structure and human capital. In turn, GDP growth 
affects all five absorptive capacity factors considered in the model. 
The absorptive capacity variables are also closely related to each other 
and appear to co-evolve over time, as evident from the intense web of 
causal links depicted in figure 2.b. However, the innovation variable is 
not as integrated as the other factors, and turns out to be only related 
to physical capital accumulation (embodied technical progress). 
 
Latin America: GDP per capita growth is sustained by the dynamics 
of three absorptive capacity variables: industrial structure, internation-
al trade and physical capital. Income per capita dynamics does in turn 
feedback and sustains the further growth of absorptive capacity. Dif-
ferently from the previous group, however, the innovation variable 
does also emerge as an important factor determining GDP growth (a 
specific result which is more in line with the advanced club model re-
sults than the middle-income group). 
 
Proposition 2: Similarly to what observed for the less developed 
country club, the three groups included in the middle-income club do 
also present a variety of relationships and do not conform easily to any 
single model specification. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract the 
key general results that are common to these groups. In line with our 
proposition 2, in middle-income countries absorptive capacity and 
GDP per capita growth are indeed linked by a set of two-way causal 
relationships that drive the dynamics of the system over time. The 
growth of absorptive capacity does also sustain the early formation 
and development of innovative capabilities. Innovation, in turn, does 
not emerge yet as a crucial and significant driver of economic growth 
(with the exception of the results for Latin America, as noted). 
 
Table 3.4: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Middle-income group: Eurasia (Model 8) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 1.256088 1.753681 3.33546 3.173805 5.7322 3.852011 4.500374 7.403352 7.305783 No
GDP per Capita → Innovation 0.085303 2.176825 1.982614 2.773364 3.92464 6.769482 7.139918 7.594226 6.811045 No
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 6.606705 ** 8.691098 ** 8.348682 ** 9.828883 ** 11.80454 ** 17.4857 *** 17.56416 ** 20.23966 *** 23.24965 *** Yes
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 0.85134 1.081269 1.107277 2.288425 3.228486 1.959444 8.707861 8.469537 13.88684 No
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 3.546031 * 5.766814 * 6.155807 10.19523 ** 16.15096 *** 14.88945 ** 16.73801 ** 21.76546 *** 21.64191 ** Yes
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 0.489203 4.178213 9.491705 ** 10.83704 ** 11.33098 ** 15.16153 ** 12.32618 * 12.94067 12.35005 Yes
International Trade → GDP per Capita 1.82024 2.814424 3.318474 10.51027 ** 12.54068 ** 17.98042 *** 15.30264 ** 17.15313 ** 16.75093 * Yes
GDP per Capita → International Trade 1.002555 36.57303 *** 40.48991 *** 41.36167 *** 42.60899 *** 41.10863 *** 47.06549 *** 55.20259 *** 52.4369 *** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 0.933859 0.972054 1.239285 1.443185 3.658286 4.676375 8.006493 7.929018 8.292946 No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 5.476796 ** 10.99212 *** 8.925929 ** 9.281593 * 8.511339 8.585701 9.107006 8.684674 13.84446 No
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 7.434335 *** 9.633452 *** 10.37913 ** 8.506486 * 7.200801 7.623993 7.470804 7.318141 6.727293 No
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 22.69409 *** 27.49604 *** 29.55907 *** 26.29687 *** 26.42688 *** 24.76938 *** 22.1744 *** 19.54831 ** 20.5354 ** Yes
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Table 3.4: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Middle-income group: Eurasia (Model 8) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 0.0008 0.101287 2.164377 2.184653 7.813663 9.728194 11.28591 12.61664 11.82989 No
Innovation → Physical Capital 1.30906 3.285886 4.896411 4.500113 4.382155 3.396037 5.154979 6.471199 5.598155 No
Human Capital → Innovation 0.986005 2.343412 2.477989 2.205702 3.897059 3.84752 4.62327 3.576795 3.511999 No
Innovation → Human Capital 0.00267 0.074925 0.159325 1.505522 3.970615 4.99654 5.488646 5.892891 7.825123 No
International Trade → Innovation 2.720053 * 1.584431 1.631617 2.711125 7.32061 6.261691 4.684002 4.760568 4.992033 No
Innovation → International Trade 0.353073 0.7602 1.811949 1.757464 2.027278 2.412075 2.337998 6.245847 6.046586 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 0.102769 4.283777 4.900745 6.18625 6.58651 7.862128 9.176734 10.98331 10.95932 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 0.776558 1.464121 0.835615 1.413747 1.550263 0.940714 1.351855 1.848693 1.969146 No
Industrial Structure → Innovation 0.368711 1.53302 2.720379 4.620456 3.825589 5.583928 5.966314 6.632023 7.552713 No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 1.449248 1.192147 1.911474 2.206853 1.855267 2.220274 1.767584 2.049762 3.312486 No
Human Capital → Physical Capital 7.143948 *** 5.919942 * 3.648548 4.698333 5.947145 6.336737 12.4069 * 10.42799 12.47731 No
Physical Capital → Human Capital 0.912295 5.697776 * 8.825119 ** 12.46177 ** 15.27072 *** 14.1314 ** 11.71804 12.66638 22.02207 *** Yes
International Trade → Physical Capital 2.948011 * 1.623805 1.066854 12.28596 ** 17.63104 *** 17.60059 *** 15.54603 ** 17.14471 ** 20.91911 ** Yes
Physical Capital → International Trade 5.607981 ** 4.840571 * 5.876979 6.541689 7.415104 7.773979 9.906368 11.40916 12.356 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 2.345949 2.093266 0.976885 4.00716 6.031168 7.638311 15.52391 ** 12.42143 15.30215 * No
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.343351 5.699399 * 7.340845 * 7.364011 8.116125 8.087045 9.748096 10.3858 9.792667 No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 2.784557 * 3.896975 4.3491 3.646904 4.11054 4.185973 8.082147 7.960002 14.79902 * No
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 12.27902 *** 13.22119 *** 12.47141 *** 12.99913 ** 11.40262 ** 14.72878 ** 15.68915 ** 15.46521 * 18.60126 ** Yes
International Trade → Human Capital 1.006428 2.43823 8.76498 ** 9.136255 * 6.582587 10.84615 * 8.667918 7.033352 7.807257 No
Human Capital → International Trade 7.583751 *** 7.137934 ** 12.89449 *** 12.02592 ** 14.85872 ** 15.02361 ** 13.20557 * 13.03257 13.06021 Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 3.045861 * 1.829354 7.231481 * 7.403258 7.456558 12.19013 * 13.75556 * 15.08747 * 11.94154 Yes
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 1.848321 2.100915 1.525151 2.148771 5.400783 7.920114 11.70703 10.2146 15.53413 * No
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 9.33492 *** 12.88559 *** 13.78698 *** 18.14293 *** 24.72786 *** 25.2334 *** 26.69418 *** 30.20928 *** 30.70133 *** Yes
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 2.686556 4.304796 4.979258 6.364368 5.006957 4.78505 5.562942 5.989611 14.50353 No
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 0.355328 1.35463 1.316021 0.798837 0.657942 1.860809 1.712786 2.043658 2.395934 No
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 0.988627 0.858848 3.533524 2.560544 5.993047 5.78903 6.029264 5.204209 4.395495 No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 0.610997 0.875523 1.593156 4.247571 3.780879 5.161657 6.950547 5.109531 6.85884 No
International Trade → Industrial Structure 6.229416 ** 5.521738 * 5.544559 6.141806 11.15771 ** 14.22382 ** 18.80108 *** 15.81819 ** 13.10575 Yes
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 18.70186 *** 21.58792 *** 17.19068 *** 14.6845 *** 13.98901 ** 15.03515 ** 12.82614 * 13.25297 13.39833 Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 1.144561 13.24485 *** 12.23155 *** 13.83176 *** 16.73857 *** 15.69122 ** 16.12227 ** 15.78039 ** 18.09236 ** Yes
Middle-income group - Eurasia (Model 8)
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Table 3.5: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Middle-income group: Latin America (Model 2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 9.038952 *** 4.380415 4.003504 10.18703 ** 13.58635 ** 16.26115 ** 14.30657 ** 12.76981 15.51271 * Yes
GDP per Capita → Innovation 2.537719 7.406848 ** 8.096016 ** 5.784721 4.506155 6.027 7.490076 8.480894 9.884648 No
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 14.09325 *** 17.96337 *** 20.65038 *** 21.80838 *** 26.84105 *** 29.72431 *** 30.8311 *** 25.49007 *** 36.09483 *** Yes
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 20.38976 *** 14.26215 *** 14.87304 *** 12.05187 ** 10.8231 * 10.78254 * 10.97796 12.1049 13.95496 Yes
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 0.441794 0.866617 5.840287 5.87023 13.7904 ** 18.20144 *** 12.29503 * 10.58608 11.03524 No
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 3.82762 * 5.62943 * 14.90504 *** 25.94611 *** 33.58423 *** 39.24325 *** 36.2835 *** 40.39735 *** 27.23769 *** Yes
International Trade → GDP per Capita 3.534459 * 7.562947 ** 7.585639 * 9.817659 ** 10.67534 * 9.267893 7.439277 5.282107 8.017161 Yes
GDP per Capita → International Trade 0.116606 1.836419 6.025191 9.780456 ** 10.93871 * 15.22621 ** 18.02513 ** 15.77703 ** 13.75935 Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 0.367846 0.691946 1.75104 1.490186 2.079168 2.086044 3.466786 3.78578 3.732656 No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 1.263478 0.924821 3.181517 4.839806 3.875773 4.167433 4.639512 3.877331 6.882989 No
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 0.003713 7.612028 ** 5.811814 5.86264 6.183483 13.79963 ** 15.12189 ** 24.5457 *** 19.00456 ** Yes
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 0.805751 0.68928 4.1782 3.312806 7.132023 8.776975 9.697004 10.52951 7.362059 No
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Table 3.5: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Middle-income group: Latin America (Model 2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 5.73428 ** 7.085498 ** 6.614032 * 9.146077 * 13.38613 ** 18.92227 *** 17.10386 ** 17.50154 ** 16.98585 ** Yes
Innovation → Physical Capital 10.60952 *** 0.370705 0.694498 1.057973 2.731294 3.461625 2.760104 2.591605 2.029269 No
Human Capital → Innovation 0.66346 2.020127 2.628833 10.82602 ** 10.98236 * 12.85005 ** 13.46279 * 16.14207 ** 13.96716 Yes
Innovation → Human Capital 3.190193 * 7.615379 ** 17.06912 *** 15.40268 *** 10.00945 * 14.15075 ** 13.44695 * 12.24427 19.87424 ** Yes
International Trade → Innovation 8.112836 *** 6.765157 ** 9.158946 ** 6.398906 7.938271 12.40587 * 12.86618 * 15.87919 ** 18.00015 ** Yes
Innovation → International Trade 0.00038 0.624608 0.775149 1.073745 2.55965 6.555292 7.043276 10.9861 12.72809 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 0.547909 0.617515 0.562934 0.516169 0.879783 1.385039 3.927443 5.384474 5.395562 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 0.00000443 1.584557 1.213868 1.594506 0.679713 2.212854 4.311211 3.723372 4.237226 No
Industrial Structure → Innovation 0.000689 0.695356 2.787992 2.782369 2.153666 8.265818 5.634919 5.122147 8.661438 No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 12.1552 *** 17.81375 *** 18.5164 *** 8.364511 * 8.893626 8.435074 13.87224 * 11.71165 16.30849 * Yes
Human Capital → Physical Capital 0.451398 5.32302 * 5.792999 4.597646 6.544058 6.915113 7.07394 8.18772 8.629408 No
Physical Capital → Human Capital 0.057605 1.601666 1.39761 14.13597 *** 18.02334 *** 23.81926 *** 19.19876 *** 18.19228 ** 15.1688 * Yes
International Trade → Physical Capital 0.204497 5.008488 * 5.538835 8.671985 * 10.3066 * 9.909181 10.40103 12.85054 11.8648 No
Physical Capital → International Trade 0.307004 1.049638 0.989689 3.044119 2.489405 5.149029 5.775821 11.06935 9.386546 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 0.004206 0.332474 1.843433 2.754951 4.230152 5.905046 4.87909 6.703157 5.840813 No
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.329188 0.027795 0.136296 1.366133 1.146931 3.743517 3.379482 3.89963 6.921766 No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 1.17225 2.728755 2.65741 2.006415 4.369836 4.516496 5.752847 12.92541 10.44882 No
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 0.98236 0.27605 0.381502 0.861918 10.25861 * 10.54451 13.77909 * 12.92085 9.315892 No
International Trade → Human Capital 1.895605 3.423065 3.890833 8.330223 * 8.865173 9.304829 16.34499 ** 11.32917 4.956665 No
Human Capital → International Trade 0.074657 1.113806 0.817759 2.152793 3.887503 4.235041 6.957525 8.407151 8.223003 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 0.229444 1.359915 2.086943 2.474788 4.468585 4.548958 3.507495 3.776527 8.079179 No
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 1.274938 2.375213 1.248653 1.959236 2.090733 3.217935 6.607463 10.27108 15.2171 * No
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 0.427516 0.964536 2.874057 7.794246 * 8.969091 8.763112 11.39525 5.527159 10.63638 No
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 1.939018 1.625379 1.279681 8.052914 * 8.837224 9.183601 28.26601 *** 23.75996 *** 13.11527 No
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 1.240011 0.374872 0.170051 0.548952 0.361546 1.347779 3.544934 8.082801 10.54352 No
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 0.431755 0.850342 2.327283 4.388135 6.264778 12.04972 * 13.20643 * 15.8607 ** 14.59234 No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 4.148719 ** 2.910178 3.04991 5.995696 10.27424 * 14.01789 ** 12.95494 * 26.27606 *** 34.47602 *** Yes
International Trade → Industrial Structure 2.426313 1.716954 1.807747 3.980315 3.873024 1.788803 14.71603 ** 13.43545 * 11.53726 No
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 0.044756 6.534466 ** 8.086446 ** 7.947963 * 6.283206 6.352034 6.171667 7.003808 9.174469 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 0.072481 3.23961 3.237165 3.654384 4.022999 4.249035 10.24491 12.81245 12.97261 No
Middle-income group - Latin America (Model 2)
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Table 3.6: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Middle-income group: East Asia (Model 2) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 0.031069 0.497029 0.807589 1.110074 1.35479 2.262416 3.053805 5.270744 9.614476 No
GDP per Capita → Innovation 0.257333 0.560631 2.987651 6.90641 6.976332 13.61043 ** 17.90513 ** 18.59646 ** 22.06601 *** No
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 3.137044 * 2.353688 1.870725 3.290189 3.458543 5.903829 14.36965 ** 16.08232 ** 11.72746 No
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 38.19327 *** 35.9233 *** 44.70114 *** 40.36395 *** 38.42928 *** 36.94239 *** 33.09701 *** 33.77489 *** 31.92875 *** Yes
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 2.095333 1.244552 1.666068 2.921097 2.690781 1.514837 6.262829 10.05933 15.11117 * No
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 1.132694 7.366293 ** 10.06079 ** 8.413731 * 9.766969 * 10.88789 * 9.749118 10.92178 8.125261 Yes
International Trade → GDP per Capita 0.344061 5.677089 * 6.024818 6.537816 5.568121 7.224593 9.304456 8.676756 13.91093 No
GDP per Capita → International Trade 8.275553 *** 8.502037 ** 6.422741 * 8.460929 * 10.72662 * 13.70232 ** 21.20573 *** 17.158 ** 26.33807 *** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 1.156681 3.313034 3.149287 2.803083 2.660248 1.947304 3.797349 6.240508 12.814 No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 1.562949 3.340009 4.09257 6.900411 6.593771 6.434885 7.556553 7.684618 8.073363 No
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 2.167007 2.787553 4.494451 11.64092 ** 8.405285 15.68528 ** 19.01059 *** 18.29066 ** 18.57823 ** Yes
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 4.345564 ** 8.497871 ** 18.77975 *** 19.02383 *** 21.98334 *** 18.26425 *** 20.22082 *** 19.30863 ** 16.15217 * Yes
Causal relationships
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Table 3.6: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Middle-income group: East Asia (Model 2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 0.046784 4.628025 * 10.14749 ** 12.98935 ** 15.07358 ** 16.81691 ** 15.35397 ** 15.90477 ** 14.07089 Yes
Innovation → Physical Capital 0.021537 2.345874 3.637672 3.692302 4.590707 5.426355 4.803071 9.084237 10.29263 No
Human Capital → Innovation 0.810524 0.693979 1.435601 1.895516 2.095322 5.683615 7.178752 7.296062 10.0785 No
Innovation → Human Capital 0.006338 1.961471 2.066032 6.488793 6.914395 3.066451 4.2981 2.167441 3.501458 No
International Trade → Innovation 0.891355 1.051985 0.746219 3.568681 4.299283 7.190337 10.76951 8.538163 7.28775 No
Innovation → International Trade 1.45947 1.680647 1.691198 6.81323 3.906527 2.575499 6.267132 5.793019 10.74966 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 0.10474 2.118882 1.909767 3.226405 3.598462 4.467328 4.374077 7.025789 5.560929 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 5.462848 ** 8.701934 ** 10.50202 ** 13.58952 *** 17.63548 *** 22.06297 *** 17.50421 ** 16.89657 ** 15.70431 * Yes
Industrial Structure → Innovation 1.093034 0.243378 0.957658 0.318573 1.166351 5.70941 9.526518 8.336699 8.441276 No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 0.815911 0.308408 0.558063 3.769556 5.738511 5.316759 5.90846 7.998942 7.528945 No
Human Capital → Physical Capital 0.714587 12.24263 *** 10.05757 ** 8.141788 * 9.097884 10.68207 * 13.0874 * 12.23762 13.34105 Yes
Physical Capital → Human Capital 0.642274 0.043028 1.076479 3.902103 4.106504 3.486289 4.607823 5.614583 11.35986 No
International Trade → Physical Capital 0.132554 1.086462 2.970299 2.634681 6.876061 8.928618 11.62503 15.32985 * 14.94388 * No
Physical Capital → International Trade 3.924606 ** 4.223421 7.021339 * 15.65198 *** 11.90424 ** 12.7721 ** 15.50148 ** 23.5166 *** 30.18711 *** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 1.089665 4.660824 * 8.290468 ** 7.292259 8.864628 10.2067 10.28901 11.29999 12.05293 No
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.954287 5.052694 * 5.007226 3.741799 8.538068 8.011567 7.11038 6.71754 5.672291 No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 5.415623 ** 12.35318 *** 17.58875 *** 17.43291 *** 16.01401 *** 12.48579 * 17.06518 ** 15.52927 ** 19.2743 ** Yes
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 1.956212 5.837493 * 2.749932 4.382378 8.114638 6.921495 10.37741 13.4422 * 12.27167 No
International Trade → Human Capital 1.345609 2.024032 5.795701 8.93327 * 13.30767 ** 24.706 *** 17.92703 ** 20.88709 *** 16.96406 ** Yes
Human Capital → International Trade 0.486789 5.191466 * 8.490484 ** 5.640048 5.1877 9.098332 13.88283 * 17.13438 ** 17.74226 ** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 1.93464 2.680761 4.544933 4.746885 5.517141 4.951467 5.860963 6.808008 5.912234 No
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.254942 2.771079 7.483242 * 2.975303 13.30614 ** 25.09507 *** 17.57774 ** 22.12368 *** 21.44857 ** Yes
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 0.53044 9.609063 *** 13.82538 *** 7.472632 10.19151 * 8.416788 11.73997 9.872821 11.84008 No
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 0.495919 1.77692 7.148214 * 10.28806 ** 17.23989 *** 16.4994 ** 15.18322 ** 14.86689 * 14.21853 Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 1.203816 1.632975 3.724074 3.622744 3.685388 3.517492 8.372652 5.811068 9.692547 No
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 0.110959 0.294288 5.168428 7.906136 * 11.08688 ** 8.911886 9.172812 17.02309 ** 20.04941 ** No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 0.065864 1.523185 1.444395 1.059604 0.816771 7.779821 10.98532 9.034153 7.005381 No
International Trade → Industrial Structure 22.79675 *** 16.12292 *** 16.32008 *** 18.50395 *** 23.40381 *** 19.31074 *** 19.3079 *** 16.32294 ** 17.86797 ** Yes
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 0.028467 0.204673 2.244218 10.97652 ** 8.583648 8.176723 9.899486 13.42706 * 11.63054 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 4.717735 ** 5.993797 ** 6.835463 * 5.623359 3.375926 3.766587 5.516387 5.105149 7.230453 No
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Figure 2.b: Summary of causal relationships (selected models – Middle-income group 
 
 
6.3 Advanced club 
In the panel of OECD economies, the set of two-way co-evolutionary 
relationships linking together GDP per capita and absorptive capacity 
still holds. Further, the absorptive capacity factors are also closely 
linked to each other by a complex web of causal relationships (see 
figure 2.c). The main difference in this advanced group vis-à-vis the 
other two is the role of innovation, which emerges as an important and 
fully integrated variable. Innovation is in fact linked by a two-way 
causal relationship to both human capital and physical capital, as out-
lined in multiple equilibria models. In addition, innovation has a direct 
causal impact on the growth of GDP per capita, and the latter variable 
does in turn sustain technological dynamics further. 
 
Proposition 3: This panel of economies is more internally homoge-
nous than the other two, and the results for this group are on the whole 
easier to interpret and more in line with Schumpeterian multiple equi-
libria models (e.g. Galor, 2005; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). 
The overview depicted in figure 2.c supports our third general hypoth-
esis: in advanced economies, innovation is linked by a two-way dy-
namic relationship to absorptive capacity, on the one hand, and to 
GDP per capita, on the other. The two-way dynamic and self-
reinforcing relationship between innovation and GDP per capita 
growth is an important growth engine in knowledge-based economies. 
 
 
  
Table 3.7: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Advanced club: OECD (Model 2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Innovation → GDP per Capita 4.307803 ** 6.068773 ** 7.290133 * 8.639795 * 12.17757 ** 10.89627 * 16.49938 ** 28.47965 *** 34.84322 *** Yes
GDP per Capita → Innovation 4.165173 ** 1.820245 2.518875 5.879192 12.83204 ** 15.83792 ** 17.15795 ** 25.51198 *** 20.57311 ** Yes
Physical Capital → GDP per Capita 0.902348 3.022746 5.543307 21.20174 *** 30.70042 *** 32.45021 *** 34.56319 *** 16.78681 ** 17.60523 ** Yes
GDP per Capita → Physical Capital 13.96126 *** 46.79016 *** 51.87806 *** 36.13333 *** 37.18055 *** 33.79698 *** 30.63456 *** 34.76556 *** 23.70289 *** Yes
Human Capital → GDP per Capita 0.008457 2.597724 4.107973 11.65858 ** 8.796283 8.160497 9.862774 13.59815 * 19.00129 ** No
GDP per Capita → Human Capital 0.045634 6.624226 ** 8.419653 ** 4.614193 3.719532 4.372777 5.325106 5.642259 6.223919 No
International Trade → GDP per Capita 5.610881 ** 6.738035 ** 6.20064 4.599915 5.690123 10.41541 12.27401 * 23.49524 *** 31.20128 *** Yes
GDP per Capita → International Trade 12.72474 *** 25.47406 *** 20.85261 *** 64.00155 *** 61.22688 *** 44.94459 *** 41.246 *** 43.1488 *** 46.36966 *** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → GDP per Capita 0.00000013 0.278112 0.319392 3.114495 3.15478 1.707277 1.712558 3.767922 2.44819 No
GDP per Capita → Socio-Institutional Context 0.12579 0.402257 3.367808 5.837111 9.03848 8.934397 9.118406 14.16716 * 13.91546 No
Industrial Structure → GDP per Capita 1.724471 3.190251 3.577351 6.283448 9.144665 12.79953 ** 16.62162 ** 25.17575 *** 32.14388 *** No
GDP per Capita → Industrial Structure 0.094945 26.75307 *** 24.78133 *** 26.9281 *** 29.15299 *** 28.10502 *** 21.31655 *** 25.45726 *** 34.86909 *** Yes
I. Interactions with GDP per capita
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 Table 3.7: Results of Granger block exogeneity tests – Advanced club: OECD (Model 2) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Physical Capital → Innovation 5.538932 ** 5.769874 * 5.164011 9.171208 * 15.8245 *** 17.90526 *** 23.90327 *** 40.21283 *** 47.97245 *** Yes
Innovation → Physical Capital 0.698551 2.139518 7.107282 * 6.519687 12.43705 ** 10.63357 21.35385 *** 35.65194 *** 44.72846 *** Yes
Human Capital → Innovation 3.569258 * 3.802728 3.121882 4.619532 9.468135 * 17.0082 *** 16.34322 ** 14.50623 * 23.47256 *** Yes
Innovation → Human Capital 4.67998 ** 6.543277 ** 14.77508 *** 14.71174 *** 15.80767 *** 9.418039 8.953719 18.99076 ** 18.05644 ** Yes
International Trade → Innovation 3.27288 * 2.575631 1.560395 1.489479 3.34916 4.100435 2.227308 10.73142 20.58809 ** No
Innovation → International Trade 1.012027 0.854288 1.987522 4.139111 1.903873 12.6658 ** 17.42688 ** 12.91091 19.99941 ** No
Socio-Institutional Context → Innovation 0.321041 0.277377 0.34069 0.67603 0.451773 3.121285 3.130323 1.972784 3.945562 No
Innovation → Socio-Institutional Context 0.681401 0.848093 1.56287 1.987142 1.509228 1.768223 1.849263 2.738142 2.59337 No
Industrial Structure → Innovation 4.497244 ** 3.554514 4.892953 2.570358 2.184925 2.645573 12.26608 * 9.177449 12.00789 No
Innovation → Industrial Structure 0.342001 0.159233 1.904911 3.853532 4.732421 5.659237 14.62105 ** 14.22221 * 21.2084 ** No
Human Capital → Physical Capital 3.84521 ** 3.907781 4.170643 6.790705 6.85124 9.892897 20.72158 *** 22.18555 *** 29.87934 *** No
Physical Capital → Human Capital 4.248995 ** 3.643313 6.730758 * 8.0383 * 11.76426 ** 14.90454 ** 16.7358 ** 15.49068 * 18.04491 ** Yes
International Trade → Physical Capital 0.009256 2.217699 3.183921 1.996678 4.822162 13.41149 ** 13.4323 * 10.02432 7.074471 No
Physical Capital → International Trade 0.930976 2.208882 3.141333 6.308306 12.84328 ** 25.0783 *** 28.2418 *** 22.3975 *** 20.92327 ** Yes
Socio-Institutional Context → Physical Capital 0.379977 0.417952 1.808435 3.592829 3.692438 3.22787 4.319188 8.677856 9.068358 No
Physical Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 0.012095 0.346297 0.754709 0.77314 0.249628 0.844531 1.583164 4.639492 5.434933 No
Industrial Structure → Physical Capital 1.792888 5.795651 * 5.630937 13.69979 *** 16.94442 *** 18.44599 *** 18.10414 ** 25.23342 *** 22.91652 *** Yes
Physical Capital → Industrial Structure 0.872861 4.053165 5.991688 11.34314 ** 22.25831 *** 28.42438 *** 34.02409 *** 24.80292 *** 31.21314 *** Yes
International Trade → Human Capital 3.598931 * 11.80507 *** 16.71012 *** 14.65955 *** 33.80615 *** 33.98226 *** 29.95926 *** 28.93393 *** 27.22426 *** Yes
Human Capital → International Trade 0.309631 4.248178 3.67437 1.304317 1.757763 3.348232 5.297187 6.816957 18.17693 ** No
Socio-Institutional Context → Human Capital 0.102076 5.435975 * 6.674187 * 6.901375 8.239518 7.972655 8.883683 9.605014 10.1562 No
Human Capital → Socio-Institutional Context 1.444272 2.146438 2.339701 3.288566 3.813672 3.033639 2.991921 3.308384 2.777609 No
Industrial Structure → Human Capital 0.16223 2.635089 3.399044 1.830582 1.400682 1.402372 1.860881 4.43397 9.833985 No
Human Capital → Industrial Structure 0.01537 0.440701 0.986435 4.409345 4.375316 3.851169 3.633042 9.882885 20.48862 ** No
Socio-Institutional Context → International Trade 1.509699 3.250447 10.39449 ** 11.8513 ** 14.54992 ** 23.67875 *** 23.74882 *** 22.23473 *** 23.48492 *** Yes
International Trade → Socio-Institutional Context 1.026858 4.727801 * 5.580671 5.352217 6.738515 5.874449 9.681841 19.09827 ** 16.40096 * No
Industrial Structure → International Trade 2.783808 * 1.373702 1.157929 4.372716 5.298082 16.68156 ** 14.08069 ** 10.84179 13.70171 No
International Trade → Industrial Structure 16.42998 *** 14.38852 *** 14.04809 *** 14.11877 *** 12.90143 ** 15.74189 ** 16.59366 ** 22.34143 *** 40.00545 *** Yes
Industrial Structure → Socio-Institutional Context 0.007372 2.772511 4.495678 5.283035 7.06492 7.711466 8.76633 10.29606 9.159842 No
Socio-Institutional Context → Industrial Structure 0.090603 1.288164 1.341213 3.278262 3.672377 5.483068 5.135523 5.56436 5.621876 No
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Figure 2.c: Summary of causal relationships (selected models – 
Advanced club) 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Proposition 4: Increasing complexity along the stages of 
development 
As pointed out in section 3, the development-stage theory corroborat-
ed by the first three propositions leads implicitly to a more general 
implication of this model framework. Since the role of absorptive ca-
pacity and innovation becomes more visible and more significant as 
we move from the less-developed group towards the middle-income 
and then the advanced club, the number of direct relationships (direct 
causal drivers of GDP per capita growth) and the number of indirect 
links (i.e. feedback effects and relationships between innovation and 
absorptive capacity dynamics) should hence be expected to increase 
along these three subsequent development stages. This is the fourth 
hypothesis we formulated in section 3. In fact, a simple comparison of 
the diagrams in figures 2.a, 2.b and 2.c suggests that this is indeed the 
case. 
 
To provide a more thorough examination of this proposition, tables 
4.a, 4.b and 4.c report an overview of the total number of significant 
causal relationships that we have found in all our Granger tests (i.e. 
considering all the 14 model specifications and the seven country 
groups). These tables provide strong support for our fourth hypothesis. 
The number of significant causal relationships – considering both di-
rect and indirect links to GDP per capita – visibly increases as we 
move from the less-developed, to the middle-income and then the ad-
vanced country club. The total number of Granger relationships for 
the three groups, in particular, amounts to 6, 12 and 18 respectively.  
 
Our interpretation of this pattern, as explained in section 3, is that as 
the process of economic development unfolds, the growth of absorp-
tive capacity and innovation capability building proceed in a non-
linear fashion, speeding up and assuming a more central role at the 
point at which threshold effects are achieved. Beyond these threshold 
levels, absorptive capacity and innovation start to co-evolve with GDP 
per capita dynamics, and this complex (and multi-dimensional) co-
evolution drives the dynamics of the economic system in the long-run. 
Increasing systemic complexity, we argue, is a general implication of 
the class of multiple equilibria and threshold growth models consid-
ered in this paper. 
 
As noted in section 3, this result is also in line with Hausman and Hi-
dalgo’s (2011) recent model of the complexity and network structure 
of economic output. As the production structure of countries becomes 
progressively more complex through processes such as increasing 
specialization and product and export differentiation – this micro- and 
industry-level complexity will be reflected in the network of economic 
relationships that characterizes each national system. Countries with a 
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more advanced production and output structure will in general be 
characterized by a more dense network of (Granger) causal relation-
ships linking together innovation, absorptive capacity and GDP per 
capita growth. 
 
Table 4.a: Number of significant Granger causal relationships:  
Less developed economies 
 
                                
Model specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average 
                
Sub-Sahara                             
  
Direct links to GDP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indirect links 4 4 5 4 5 7 7 9 6 6 8 9 6 6 6 
Total causal links 5 4 5 4 5 7 7 9 7 6 8 9 6 6 6 
                                
North Africa  & Middle-East                      
Direct links to GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indirect links 4 5 4 6 4 3 7 6 3 4 7 6 5 3 5 
Total causal links 4 5 4 6 4 3 7 6 3 4 7 6 5 3 5 
                
South Asia                               
Direct links to GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Indirect links 6 7 6 7 8 10 8 7 6 8 10 9 7 4 7 
Total causal links 6 7 6 7 8 10 8 7 6 8 10 9 7 5 7 
                
                                
Average Less developed economies 
                
  
Direct links to GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indirect links 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 5 6 8 8 6 4 6 
Total causal links 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 5 6 8 8 6 5 6 
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Table 4.b: Number of significant Granger causal relationships:  
Middle-income group 
 
                                
Model specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average 
                                
Eurasia                               
Direct links to GDP 3 1 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 
Indirect links 7 8 8 7 8 9 9 12 7 6 8 9 9 7 8 
Total causal links 10 9 11 10 10 11 13 15 10 8 12 12 13 10 11 
                                
Latin America                               
Direct links to GDP 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 
Indirect links 11 10 7 9 11 13 8 8 9 12 10 8 11 9 10 
Total causal links 15 14 11 13 15 17 11 11 14 17 13 11 14 12 13 
                                
East Asia                               
Direct links to GDP 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Indirect links 13 14 13 8 8 11 8 11 11 11 11 10 8 12 11 
Total causal links 14 15 13 8 10 11 9 12 13 11 12 11 8 13 11 
                                
                                
Average Middle-income group 
                         
  
Direct links to GDP 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 
Indirect links 10 11 9 8 9 11 8 10 9 10 10 9 9 9 10 
Total causal links 13 13 12 10 12 13 11 13 12 12 12 11 12 12 12 
                                
 
Table 4.c: Number of significant Granger causal relationships:  
Advanced (OECD) club 
 
                                
Model specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average 
                                
OECD                                
Direct links to GDP 2 3 5 5 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Indirect links 14 15 14 13 15 17 14 15 13 15 15 13 11 11 14 
Total causal links 16 18 19 18 18 20 18 19 16 18 19 17 15 15 18 
                                
7. Conclusions 
The paper has presented an empirical analysis of the time series impli-
cations of multiple equilibria and convergence clubs models. It has 
considered a panel of 116 countries over the period 1980-2008, and 
made use of panel cointegration analysis (VECM and Granger causali-
ty estimations) to identify the set of dynamic relationships linking to-
gether innovation, absorptive capacity and economic growth. The 
Granger results provide general support for this class of Schumpeteri-
an multiple equilibria models, and point out four main results: (1) In 
the less-developed country club, neither innovation nor absorptive ca-
pacity is a crucial driver of GDP per capita; (2) In the middle-income 
group, absorptive capacity emerges as an important factor fostering 
GDP per capita dynamics and innovation capability building; (3) In 
the advanced club, there exists a complex set of two-way relationships 
linking together innovation and absorptive capacity, on the one hand, 
and GDP per capita growth, on the other; (4) The complexity of the 
economic system – measured by the number of significant Granger 
causal relationships – increases as we move from the less-developed, 
to the middle-income and then to the advanced country clubs. 
 
We believe that the empirical model and approach adopted in this pa-
per provide three original contributions to the literature, but each of 
these contributions does also present a possible limitation and chal-
lenge for future research in this field. Let us briefly point out these 
three contributions and related issues. 
 
The first important aspect refers to the heterogeneity of the growth 
process. While the convergence clubs literature and multiple equilibria 
models typically provide a stylized view of cross-country heterogenei-
ty – most often by means of a three-club typology – our analysis has 
made use of a two-tier approach and further divided each of the three 
clubs into a few sub-groups of countries, which are internally homog-
enous as they belong to different geographical and socio-cultural areas 
(Sub-Sahara, North Africa and Middle-East, South Asia, East Asia, 
Eurasia, Latin America, OECD countries). The advantage of this ap-
proach is to show that there is indeed a great deal of cross-country 
heterogeneity within the three clubs of countries usually adopted in 
the literature, and that it is important to take this into account by 
means of finer typologies and clustering methods to the extent possi-
ble. However, the flip side of the coin is that the empirical results that 
we have obtained for each of the seven sub-groups of countries are not 
always clear cut, and the set of identified relationships differ some-
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what across the groups. This point shows, in more general terms, a 
limitation of the class of multiple equilibria models considered in this 
paper. These models provide an interesting and appealing dynamic 
story, which is of course a simple and general metaphor describing the 
dynamics of the economic system but does not hold true for all coun-
tries included in a given club or development stage. 
 
The second aspect we like to highlight is that the paper has made an 
explicit effort to uncover dynamic relationships by investigating the 
time-series implications of multiple equilibria and convergence clubs 
models. Our panel cointegration and Granger analyses have identified 
the existence of a complex web of relationships linking together inno-
vation, absorptive capacity and economic growth, and shown that the-
se relationships vary substantially across country groups. A drawback 
of our methodology, however, is that while we have focused on the 
existence and direction of causality among different growth engines, 
we have not estimated the structural form of the model and hence we 
are not able to identify the relative strength (or weakness) of the vari-
ous causal links. In other words, our results point out the main engines 
of growth that are relevant at different development stages but do not 
provide an indication as to which of these factors and causal relation-
ships are more important than others. White and Lu (2010) have re-
cently provided an analysis of the relationships between Granger cau-
sality analysis and dynamic structural systems, and shown that 
Granger causal relationships may in fact be interpreted as structural 
relationships characterizing the system if the so-called conditional ex-
ogeneity condition holds. White and Lu (2010)’s analysis provides an 
important suggestion of how the methodology employed in this paper 
could in the future be refined in order to estimate structural dynamic 
relationships and their different configurations in different country 
groups. 
 
Finally, the third contribution of the paper refers to the multi-
dimensionality and complexity of the growth process. While most mul-
tiple equilibria models and convergence clubs empirical studies typi-
cally focus on one or a few key explanatory factors, and the interac-
tions among them, our empirical results indicate that many dimensions 
are simultaneously important and turn out to be causally linked to 
GDP per capita dynamics: innovation, physical and human capital, 
industrial structure, international trade, and socio-institutional factors. 
Further, these dimensions are not equally important for different coun-
try clubs: the number of relevant dimensions and the number of signif-
icant causal relationships among them tend to increase as we move 
from lower to more advanced development stages. Therefore, our re-
sults suggest that increasing complexity is an important, though often 
neglected, implication of multiple equilibria models. This idea is ap-
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pealing, but the corresponding limitation of our empirical strategy is 
equally important. Our results may be interpreted as providing general 
empirical support to the class of multiple equilibria models taken as a 
whole, but they do not represent a thorough test of any specific model 
among those reviewed in section 2. The time series and panel cointe-
gration approaches adopted in this paper could be used in future re-
search to carry out empirical tests of the time series implications of 
each of these models. 
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Appendix 1: List of countries included 
in each group 
Less developed economies 
Sub-Sahara: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Ma-
lawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Ni-
geria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tan-
zania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Haiti6. 
 
North Africa and Middle-East: Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tuni-
sia. 
 
South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
Middle-income group 
Eurasia (former Soviet economies): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Ka-
zakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guya-
na, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
East Asia: Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam. 
Advanced club 
OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
                                                 
6  Haiti has been included in this country group since its economic conditions make it more 
similar to the countries there involved. 
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